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ABSTRACT. Fragmentation across scales in natural resource governance can impede coordinated action and decrease innovation
capacity. Bridging actors who connect others within governance networks helps to overcome this challenge. We analyze two bridging
positions for actors in governance networks. First, periphery connectors integrate otherwise unconnected actors and provide access to
new knowledge. Second, central coordinators efficiently connect actors at the center of the network and thus facilitate coordinated
action. We propose a way to identify periphery connectors and central coordinators within governance networks and formulate
expectations about types of actors that are likely to occupy these positions. An analysis of three actor networks in the water supply
sector in Switzerland suggests that periphery coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by organizations at higher
jurisdictional levels. Central coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by governmental actors as compared to
nongovernmental actors. Thus, in addressing challenges of fragmentation, higher level governmental actors continue to play an
important role, even when they delegate responsibilities to lower level and private actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Coordination in natural resource governance is a difficult task
because of the involvement of many governmental and
nongovernmental actors operating at different levels of spatial
and jurisdictional scales (Cash et al. 2006, Ostrom 2009, Pahl-
Wostl 2009). Changes in institutions and policy designs that
emphasize self-organization of actors in governance networks are
one way to address the challenge of coordination (Folke et al.
2005). Collaboration between individual actors in governance
networks can thus mediate the challenges of fragmented natural
resource governance (Bodin and Crona 2009).  
Actors within such governance networks, intentionally or
inadvertently, take up different positions, which potentially
contribute to coordination. For example, McAllister et al. (2014)
examine how organizations influence climate change adaptation
planning in Australia by playing a select set of roles within
governance networks. One type of role includes organizations that
interact with many other different types of organizations and are
thus important for disseminating knowledge throughout a
fragmented governance landscape. The study of Ernstson et al.
(2008) demonstrates that a lack of organizations that integrate
peripheral groups with valuable ecological knowledge into the
management of urban green areas could have constrained more
collaborative management. In a similar vein, Vignola et al. (2013)
identify so-called bridging organizations, which transmit
information across scales and policy areas, as key actors in a study
of watershed management in Costa Rica.  
This analysis focuses on actors who occupy bridging positions in
natural resource governance networks in further detail. In
general, actors in bridging positions connect other actors who
would not be connected otherwise (Granovetter 1973). We focus
on two types of bridging that each address an essential governance
challenge resulting from fragmentation. First, bridging ties can
connect peripheral actors to the network. This integrates a more
heterogeneous set of actors into the network, which provides
access to new knowledge to the rest of the network (Carlsson and
Sandström 2008). Second, bridging ties can efficiently connect
actors who need to coordinate their actions across levels of scales
(Ernstson et al. 2008, Rathwell and Peterson 2012). Based on these
two types of bridging ties, we analyze two actor positions in
governance networks: periphery connectors and central
coordinators. We then ask which actors are likely to occupy these
positions.  
Answers to our research question contribute to the literature in
three ways. First, on a theoretical level, we develop a precise
understanding of periphery connectors and central coordinators
as two important bridging roles. The theoretical value of this
distinction extends to the existing literature in policy studies and
natural resource governance, where concepts of bridging roles are
ubiquitous (Ernstson et al. 2008, Bodin and Crona 2009,
Christopoulos and Ingold 2015). Our study answers the demand
for a more profound analysis of individual actors occupying
critical positions in natural resource governance (Bodin and
Crona 2009). Second, on the methodological level, we propose a
straightforward operationalization of both role concepts.
Especially, we identify periphery connectors by adapting a
bridging measure developed in the social network analysis
literature (Valente and Fujimoto 2010). Third, on the empirical
level, we provide insights into governance settings with a very high
potential for fragmentation. An empirical analysis of three
regions in Switzerland with different socioeconomic contexts
allows us to identify the actors that are most likely to occupy
periphery connector and central coordinator positions in these
settings.
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THE ROLE OF ACTORS IN OVERCOMING
FRAGMENTATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE NETWORKS
Fragmentation in natural resource governance
Following Jasny and Lubell (2015), we define fragmentation as a
setting where actors have overlapping responsibilities for issues
that span across multiple levels of a relevant scale of governance,
or work independently on interconnected issues. Fragmentation
impedes effective governance (Carlsson and Sandström 2008,
Ekstrom and Young 2009, Bodin et al. 2014) especially because
of competing responsibilities between different actors (Jasny and
Lubell 2015). Such competing responsibilities are a “fertile
ground” for collective action dilemmas (Berardo 2014:238). By
contrast, reducing fragmentation by integrating new and
nonpublic actors in the governance system has the potential to
include new views, information, and perspectives (Prell et al. 2009)
and enhance creativity and innovation (Betsill and Bulkeley
2004).  
Institutional adjustments have been suggested to reduce
fragmentation. For example, the concept of institutional fit (Folke
et al. 2007) suggests to better match ecological system structure
with formal and informal rules (Ekstrom and Young 2009).
Although adjusting institutions is thus a way to address issues of
fragmentation, individual actors can also contribute to
overcoming fragmentation in a governance network without
institutional change.
Overcoming fragmentation through bridging
Among actors who can contribute to the reduction of
fragmentation, actors in bridging positions play an important
role. The literature on social networks in natural resource
governance has highlighted different forms of bridging (see
Fernandez and Gould 1994, McAllister et al. 2015), such as cross-
scale brokerage (Ernstson et al. 2010, Rathwell and Peterson
2012), within- and across-type bridging (McAllister et al. 2015),
or brokering across venues or issues (Lubell 2013, Fischer et al.
2017). Although these analyses have addressed specific sources
or problems of fragmentation (levels, actor types, and issues), we
provide a more general division of bridging activity in regard to
two main problems of fragmentation. These problems are the loss
of access to new knowledge and inefficient coordination and we
suggest distinguishing two essential bridging positions that can
help to overcome them: periphery connectors and central
coordinators.  
Periphery connectors integrate otherwise unconnected actors to
the core of the network. Many studies observe a core-periphery
setting in governance situations, where a well-connected group of
core actors can be distinguished from a loosely connected
periphery (e.g., Ernstson et al. 2008, Luthe et al. 2012, Hirschi et
al. 2013, Angst and Hirschi 2016). Periphery connectors maintain
contact to the margins of the network and support access to and
integration of new knowledge. Peripheral actors are often sources
of information heterogeneity in a network because they are likely
to be less prone to groupthink, sticky information (Burt et al.
2013) and homophilous processes (where actors who interact
often become more similar over time) acting among strongly
connected actors. Furthermore, heterogeneity has also been
associated with effectiveness and adaptability in natural resource
governance networks (Carlsson and Sandström 2008).  
Central coordinators play a different bridging role than periphery
connectors. They do not reach out to the periphery, but rather
can facilitate coordinated action because of their central position.
The defining characteristic of central coordinators is that they
connect a great number of other actors—who might be connected
to each other but over longer paths—in a very efficient way. This
means that they provide the shortest network paths between many
other actors, making them logical choices if  one actor wants to
reach other actors. Central coordinators are thus key actors if  it
is necessary to coordinate action and disseminate information.
We focus on bridging centrality in this study, but there are various
other ways actors can be central in a network. Bodin and Crona
(2009) highlight several examples of how central actors can
contribute to governance outcomes through information
distribution and leadership that go beyond our specific focus on
overcoming fragmentation. Figure 1 illustrates periphery ideal-
typical periphery connector (A) and central coordinator (B)
positions.
Fig. 1. Illustrations of network positions of periphery
connector (A) and central coordinator (B) positions.
Hypotheses about distribution of positions
Some types of actors have been shown to be more likely to occupy
specific positions in natural resource governance networks. For
instance, Kininmonth et al. (2015) conclude that large
municipalities are crucial to enhance the compatibility between
the governance network structure and ecological interdependencies
in wetland management. Fliervoet et al. (2016) show how
nongovernmental actors depend on the resources and
connections of governmental actors in new governance
approaches to natural resource management. Exploring the role
of local actors in regional land use planning, Ingold (2014)
concludes that mainly intermediate-level actors, in contrast to
local or national actors, connect different parts in multilevel
networks. By contrast, Angst and Hirschi (2016) show that higher
level actors such as the national administration provide stable and
lasting connections and thus play a crucial role in network
development over time.
Hypothesis 1: Periphery connector positions are more likely to be
occupied by actors at a higher jurisdictional level than by lower
level actors.
Actor attributes are thus likely to influence which actors take up
periphery connector and central coordinator positions. There is
a line of argument within the environmental governance literature
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that stresses that directly affected, local level stakeholders are best
suited to resolve resource degradation problems and thus need to
be included in the decision-making process (Ostrom 2000). The
involvement of actors on higher levels in a polycentric
arrangement has, however, also been shown to positively affect
governance outcomes, provided that these actors do interact
sufficiently (Newig and Fritsch 2009). The concept of periphery
connectors relates to this discussion, as it highlights a mechanism
through which higher level actors can influence the effectiveness
of governance in terms of ensuring sufficient interaction.
Periphery connectors represent a network position that is
important for assuring integration of diverse knowledge but is
not necessarily (but can be) involved in the direct management of
a resource. We posit that higher level actors, who are less affected
by the mostly local or regional environmental problems and the
related solutions, are more likely to be such periphery connectors.
These actors tend to be involved in many different governance
processes, compared to local level stakeholders focused on local
problems. This involvement allows them to gain experiences, to
transfer knowledge from one setting to another, and to access a
wider network of different actors.
Hypothesis 2: Central coordinator positions are more likely to be
occupied by governmental actors than by nongovernmental actors
Whereas forms of self-regulation with only little direct
involvement of public authorities and governmental actors
became prominent steering arrangements in environmental
governance (Ostrom 2009), public actors still play an important
role. Effective (environmental) governance often results from
actors’ interaction “in the shadow of hierarchy” (Bolleyer and
Börzel 2010:182). Even in settings where they surrender formal
power, governmental actors can exert substantial influence by
putting themselves into coordinating positions (Fliervoet et al.
2016, Fischer and Schläpfer 2017). This enables them to pursue
their interests without having to rely on strategies of top-down
enforcement. A similar argument is made by the literature on
network management and meta-governance of networks,
referring to the capacity of governmental actors to steer networks
by facilitating interaction processes, mediating conflicts, and
reallocating resources (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Besides,
government and its administration are also more likely to have
the necessary resources to occupy central coordinator positions,
as compared to other actors. They often employ a larger,
specialized workforce than other actors but most importantly,
governmental actors in most cases still maintain the formal
responsibility to initiate and structure policy processes.
Consequently, they are often the preferential targets for
collaboration for other actors (Leifeld and Schneider 2012, Ingold
and Leifeld 2014, Bursens et al. 2014) and can draw upon sources
of power such as the setting of collaborative agendas and
institutional capacities (Brisbois and de Loë 2016) that other
actors often do not possess. Thus, we expect governmental actors
rather than nongovernmental actors to occupy central
coordinator positions.
CASE, DATA, AND METHODS
Case characteristics and data
Our empirical cases cover collaboration networks in water supply
governance of three administrative regions in the Swiss canton of
Basel-Landschaft. Water governance is a setting that is generally
prone to fragmentation (Jasny and Lubell 2015). In Switzerland,
the water supply sector is strongly shaped by the federalist
structure of the country: water supply is a formal responsibility
of the subnational states (so-called cantons), respecting general
national laws and the regulation of water quality and provision
as laid out in the Constitution. When it comes to operational tasks
of water distribution, provision, and infrastructure however,
responsibilities typically are delegated to the municipalities.  
More recently, several reforms have been initiated to regionalize
water supply; that is, to encourage municipalities to comanage
water supply tasks, often also involving new actors such as private
companies. Consequently, regionalization increases the potential
for fragmentation. Moreover, new challenges such as an
increasing number of extreme events or aging infrastructure
demand the inclusion of further organizations such as scientific
experts or planning and engineering firms. This reorganization
further increases the need for coordination and collaboration in
the water sector.  
In terms of case selection, studying three cases within a single
subnational state holds many intervening factors constant.
Reforms in terms of reorganization and regionalization of water
supply, encompassing the comanagement of and shared
responsibility for service supply tasks, finances, and
infrastructures have been proposed in the three selected cases. The
three regions represent an urban, a peri-urban, and a rural area,
respectively. Whereas the first two are located in flatland areas
with industrialized sites, the latter region is characterized by
mountainous landscape and agriculture.  
Data for our analysis of the collaboration networks stem from a
survey carried out between September and December 2015 among
public authorities and stakeholders involved in the water supply
sector. For actor identification, we started with a preliminary
interview with the subnational lead-agency. Through scoping
interviews and snowball sampling conducted in late 2013 and
early 2014, the full actors list was first drawn, then validated by
seven public officials and key stakeholders from the three regions.
For each of the three regions, the actor list included state and
federal offices, municipal authorities, waterworks, engineering
companies, water providers, local water technicians, and relevant
interest groups. Survey participants were considered as
representatives of public or private organizations, thus answering
the survey questions on behalf  of a corporate actor (Coleman
1974). The only exceptions were local water technicians: though
a majority were public actors, they typically carried out their task
as individuals.  
Respondents were asked to indicate with which other actors on
the actor list they regularly collaborated in water supply
management in the region. Regular collaboration was defined as
either the repeated exchange of information or the joint
implementation of projects. We surveyed 64 actors in the urban,
56 actors in the peri-urban, and 52 actors in the rural region.
Response rates were 93%, 86%, and 92%, respectively. Based on
the survey responses, we found three collaboration networks with
79 actors in the urban, 73 actors in the peri-urban, and 59 actors
in the rural region. The collaboration networks include more
actors than surveyed because some actors indicated
nonrespondents as collaboration partners. There were many
actors that were involved in all three regions. These were generally
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actors situated on higher administrative levels, such as state and
national agencies or interest groups. However, their collaboration
patterns were assessed for every region separately. Actors were
manually assigned a dummy variable to indicate their status as
governmental or nongovernmental. They were also manually
assigned one of four jurisdictional levels based on an
organization’s main focus of operations. The four jurisdictional
levels considered were local (single municipality), regional
(multiple municipalities), state (across the whole state), and
national (extending beyond the state of Basel-Landschaft).  
We symmetrized all three networks in our analysis based on a
weak criterion, establishing an undirected tie whenever one actor
indicated another actor as a collaboration partner. We
symmetrized the data in order to remove directed ties because the
conceptual meaning of directed ties in a collaboration network is
hard to interpret, given that collaboration is a process that always
involves the participation of both parties. We chose weak rather
than strong symmetrization because it also captures lower forms
of collaboration where actors are not equally willing to call their
relationship collaboration. However, such forms of collaboration
capture phenomena such as access to information or sporadic
contact that we expect to be a more likely form of interaction
among actors of the periphery and the core.
Operationalizing periphery connectors and central coordinators
The operationalization of periphery connector positions was
based on assessing the number of actors that are solely connected
to the network by a given actor. To do so, we assessed the effect
of the removal of every actor on its own on the number of actors
in newly created components apart from the main component of
the network because of the actor’s removal. We thus estimated
the effect of node-wise deletion on an overall structural network
characteristic akin to the procedure suggested by Valente and
Fujimoto (2010) who locate critical connectors via edge-wise
deletion.  
For central coordinators, we relied on betweenness centrality (see,
e.g., Borgatti and Everett 2006). Betweenness centrality measures
how often an actor lies on a shortest path between any two actors
it is connected to. A shortest path is defined as the connections
with the minimal number of connections that an actor needs to
reach another actor. For each shortest path that passes through
a node, if  there exist other paths that bypass the node, the
contribution toward the node’s betweenness centrality score of
this shortest path is divided by the total number of shortest paths.
Betweenness centrality measures exactly what we understand as
central coordination, namely, the provision of efficient pathways
within a network captured in the relative number of shortest paths
running through a node.  
We computed betweenness scores based on an actor’s position in
its respective ego network of order 2 (this includes cross-
connections between all other actors an actor is connected to).
This means that all other actors connected to the ego by paths of
length 1 or 2 were included in our computation. Betweenness
scores thus reflected an actor’s position within a local ego
network. The reason for focusing on ego networks is that for
collaborative activities it is difficult to attach substantive meaning
to path lengths longer than 2 (Gould and Fernandez 1989).
Analytical steps
In a first step, we identified the actors that were positioned within
the network according to our operationalization of periphery
connector and central coordination positions. We extracted ego
networks and calculated betweenness scores using the R packages
statnet (Handcock et al. 2003) and igraph (Csardi and Nepusz
2006). In order to check whether our networks exhibited a core-
periphery structure, we also partitioned the network datasets
using the CORR algorithm implemented in UCINET (Borgatti
et al. 2002) to assign actors to two distinct sets by maximizing the
correlation between the observed and an ideal core-periphery
structure.  
In a second step, we carried out a statistical analysis to assess our
hypotheses about the distribution of positions. It compared our
observed networks to a large number of simulated networks in a
permutation-based approach. In social network analysis,
permutation-based approaches are used to construct null models
that provide a baseline against which to compare the empirically
observed networks. These permutation models aim to preserve
the network structure while allowing for individual actor
positions to vary (Spiro et al. 2013). For this analysis, we specified
a pooled exponential random graph model (ERGM), which fit
the set of parameters that on average best represent the data
generating process throughout all three regions.  
The pooled model was used to simulate a baseline distribution of
positions that takes into account the main processes that shape
the structure of the networks under study. We then compared this
distribution against our observed distribution of network
positions. We modeled both dyad-independent and dependent
processes we theoretically expected to play a role in shaping
network characteristics in our cases. We deemed the use of a
pooled model, resulting in the same set of parameters for every
region, to be superior to the estimation of a separate model for
every case. It increased our confidence in comparing inferences
based on baseline distributions generated through a process that
is identical for every region because we saw no theoretical reason
why the basic underlying processes shaping network structure
should vary significantly between our cases.  
We considered two dyad-independent processes in our model.
First, we expected the respective activity of different actor types
to vary. In this regard, we included terms that model activity for
actors on different jurisdictional levels because we expected
intermediate and lower-level actors to be more active in the
network in general. Second, we also expected homophilous
processes based on actor type to shape the networks. This
encompasses a potential tendency for actors to favor similar
actors in collaboration. In this regard, we modeled homophily
among actors situated on the same jurisdictional level. We
expected networks to be strongly shaped by this process because
state-level actors in particular are often formally mandated to
collaborate among themselves. Further, we also considered dyad-
dependent processes that include the propensity for triadic closure
and the shape of the degree distribution because these processes
are generally expected to play a role in shaping governance
network structure (Robins et al. 2012).  
After achieving a satisfying fit, our pooled model was used to
simulate 1000 random networks for every region. These simulated
networks, by the virtue of being based on a fitted model, captured
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Table 1. Number of periphery connectors and central coordinators per region and by type (governmental/nongovernmental) and
jurisdictional level.
 
Periphery connectors Central coordinators
Attribute Urban Peri-urban Rural Urban Peri-urban Rural
Governmental 2 2 2 2 2 2
Nongovernmental 2 2 1 4 1 1
Federal level 1 1 1 1 0 0
State level 2 2 2 4 3 3
Regional level 0 0 0 0 0 0
Local level 1 1 0 1 0 0
Total 4 4 3 6 3 3
many of the basic processes inherent in our empirical cases and
therefore reflected theoretically important processes shaping
network structure we wanted to control for. This enables us to
assess whether our empirically observed position patterns were
more likely to occur than by chance, while controlling for our
modeled effects. We did so by comparing the empirically observed
distribution of positions to the related distribution in the
simulated networks. We analyzed two distributional patterns
based on our hypotheses about factors shaping the distribution
of positions. We assessed the likelihood for (a) higher level (state
and national level) actors to be periphery connectors, and (b)
governmental actors to be central coordinators. For reasons of
comparison, we further analyzed the distributional patterns and
related likelihoods of (c) governmental actors to be periphery
connectors, and (d) higher level actors to be central coordinators.
We estimated, simulated, and assessed goodness of fit of ERGMs
using the R package xergm (Leifeld et al. 2016).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Distribution of positions
All networks show a more-or-less pronounced core-periphery
structure with within-core densities between 0.55 and 0.67 and
within-periphery densities between 0.04 and 0.05. This result
indicates that the networks can be partitioned in a strongly
connected core and a weakly connected periphery, which
corresponds to our observation, based on previous studies, that
in many governance situations, a well-connected group of core
actors can be distinguished from a loosely connected periphery
(Ernstson et al. 2008, Luthe et al. 2012, Hirschi et al. 2013).  
Figure 2 shows all three collaboration networks. The identified
periphery connectors and central coordinators are indicated by
color. We consider an actor to be a periphery connector if  the
actor connects a minimum of two peripheral actors that would
otherwise not be connected to the network. Further, we consider
actors to be central coordinators if  their betweenness scores
within their respective ego network exceed a cut-off  value of two
standard deviations of the scaled distributions of these measures
in their respective networks. We chose this cut-off  value based on
a sensitivity analysis (see Fig. A1.1 in Appendix 1), balancing the
need of having a comparable cut-off  value across regions and
choosing a cut-off  point at a value where small variations do not
create large jumps in the number of central coordinators.  
We identify four periphery connectors in the urban and peri-urban
regions and three in the rural region. Six central coordinators are
present in the urban region, and three in the peri-urban and rural
regions. The distribution of these actors by jurisdictional level
and governmental/nongovernmental status is detailed in Table 1.  
The comparison of simulated distributions of actor positions
versus observed values for the interaction with the set of actor
attributes covered in our hypotheses is shown in Figure 3.
Generally, our results are stable in their tendency across regions.
This suggests that the processes generating the distribution of
positions are similar across socioeconomic contexts, even though
these regions differ with respect to the challenges to water supply
governance.  
The exact model specifications of the pooled ERGM used for
baseline simulations can be found in the Appendix 1 (Table A1.1).
Model fit throughout all three regions is sufficient to generate
networks that are better in recreating networks of the type we
observed than a model controlling only for network density.
Goodness of fit plots that illustrate how far the model replicates
a set of not modeled network statistics can be found in Appendix
1 (Fig. A1.2). The model is biased in two main ways because it
generally creates networks that are more clustered than the
observed networks and tends to produce a smaller number of
isolates. This inadequacy can be expected because it reflects the
minimal theoretical assumptions about drivers of network
structure we incorporated into our model for all three regions.
However, this issue does not present a major concern because the
main purpose of the model is to create a viable baseline
distribution against which to compare each observed network,
and we consider the fit to be adequate for this purpose.
Periphery connectors
As compared to the simulated networks, higher level actors
(national/state) are more likely to occupy network positions
associated with periphery connector positions. These results thus
support our first hypothesis that periphery connector positions
are more likely to be occupied by higher level actors. We expected
this to be the case because of the range of operations of national
and state-level actors that often encompasses a broader set of
other actors than it is the case for lower level actors. The empirical
evidence based on the statistical models and on our analysis of
specific individual roles adopted by actors such as the Federal
Office for the Environment supports this idea. The integration of
peripheral actors to the natural resource governance network
allows for the access of sources of information heterogeneity,
which has been claimed to contribute to effectiveness and
adaptability (Carlsson and Sandström 2008). Some studies have
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Fig. 2. Collaboration networks in water supply for three regions in the Swiss canton of Basel-Landschaft. Colors
indicate periphery connector and central coordinator positions.
stressed that sources of new and diverse knowledge need not come
from outside but can also be found among local level stakeholders
(Knapp et al. 2014). However, we found no evidence that
periphery connectors in our cases interact with peripheral local-
level actors. This is most likely due to the fact that there were few
peripheral local-level actors in the cases we studied. It would
therefore be interesting to see future research in cases where local-
level actors are less integrated into the network to elucidate the
kinds of periphery connectors that build bridges to peripheral
local-level actors.  
We did not formulate a hypothesis on whether periphery
connectors would be more likely to be governmental or
nongovernmental actors. Yet, an additional finding of our study
is the higher likelihood for periphery connector positions to be
occupied by governmental actors. Governmental actors might
have an interest in reaching out for new information. This is, for
example, highlighted by Crona and Parker’s (2012) study on
bridging organizations, where public policy makers engaged in
enhanced information- and evidence-based water management
decisions because of their contacts with other types of actors. Our
result showing that governance actors are more likely to occupy
the position of periphery connectors should however be regarded
as only tentative evidence. This is due to the fact that most of the
governmental actors in the three networks under investigation are
located at the national or state level, and thus considered higher
level organizations. Given the specific nature of our case, we
therefore feel more warranted to conclude that, in line with our
first hypothesis, the higher level of actors is crucial to making
them more likely to be periphery connectors. These positions
might just as likely be occupied by nongovernmental, higher level
actors in cases where these are more prevalent. This might be
especially true for cases including transnational settings, where
higher level, nongovernmental actors have been shown to assume
important roles in policy processes (Tantivess and Walt 2008).  
A closer look at the actors occupying periphery connector
positions shows that our measure identifies a meaningful set of
actors. The Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) has a
periphery connector position in all regions. For the purpose of
illustration, the position of the FOEN in its respective ego
network of order two is shown in Figure 4. Albeit the FOEN is
not a central actor, it is the only actor that connects two national
actors to a number of central state-level agencies in the network.
The two national actors that only collaborate with the FOEN are
two organizations dedicated to interstate coordination within the
federal system. These are the KVU and BPUK, which are the
conferences of heads of Swiss state agencies for environmental
protection and spatial protection, respectively. Both of these
organizations are good examples in terms of actors who are not
involved in day-to-day management of water supply but may be
of importance for giving access to a broader network of actors,
for example, to disseminate good practices learned in other states.
Moreover, the FOEN itself  collaborates directly with another
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Fig. 3. Frequency (count) of the occurence of four actor types in three Swiss water supply governance networks.
The solid lines show the real, observed number of each actor type. The bars illustrate the distribution obtained
from 1000 simulated networks based on a pooled exponential random graph model of the networks. The more
the solid line deviates to the right from the distribution, the more likely it is that the given actor type is observed
more often than by chance.
important periphery connector in all regions, the state-level
fishery association (KFVBL). The state-level fishery association
integrates the two nature protection organizations present in all
regions (Pro Natura [PN_BL] and WWF) into the network. Thus,
the viewpoints of nature protection organizations are highly likely
to be passed through the fishery association. In highlighting the
special role of fishery associations in water policy fields, this result
is similar to previous research on policy networks surrounding
marine-protected areas in California (Weible and Sabatier 2005).
Central coordinators
The results of our inferential analysis suggest a slightly higher
likelihood for central coordinator positions to be occupied by
governmental actors but the empirical evidence should be seen as
a tendency rather than a clear pattern. The results therefore
provide only weak support for our second hypothesis, as the
observed number of central coordinators equals the mean of the
distribution obtained through the permutations in the peri-urban
and urban regions.  
Especially when governmental actors are located at the national
level, they do not occupy coordinating positions, whereas state-
level governmental actors do so. In singling out governmental
actors the study is in line with findings in Ernstson et al. (2010)
who found municipal and regional governmental actors to be
most active in efforts to induce collaborative governance of urban
green areas in Stockholm. The level of involvement of
governmental actors also depends on the nature of what is
governed. A study of network governance among actors involved
in tourism in the Swiss Gotthard region, where the legal
requirements for governmental involvement are less far-reaching
than for natural resources, they played a lesser (though still
pronounced) coordinator role (Luthe et al. 2012).  
Another finding of our analysis is that in all regions, private and
public actors at the state-level, in contrast to the national,
regional, and local levels, tend to occupy central coordinator
positions. Results further indicate that the state level is likely to
be the decisive level for coordinating collaboration in Swiss water
governance. A possible explanation for this finding is that state-
level actors directly interact with local-level stakeholders (as
opposed to most national-level actors) but do so in various
numbers of local settings (as opposed to local- and regional-level
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Fig. 4. Ego network (order two) of collaboration ties of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN,
indicated by red circle) in the water supply governance network of a peri-urban region in the Swiss canton of
Basel-Landschaft. The figure illustrates the periphery connector role of the FOEN. KVU and BPUK are the
conferences of heads of Swiss state agencies for environmental protection and spatial protection, respectively.
The node labeled KFVBL represents the state level fishery association, itself  a periphery connector. It integrates
two nature protection organizations (PN_BL and WWF) into the network.
actors). This mixture of perspectives, direct local involvement,
broader oversight, provides state-level actors with the capacity to
play a coordinating role. Although our results do not readily
transfer to other, especially nonfederalist settings, it is plausible
that the mixture of these two different perspectives is a more
general pattern inducing coordinative activity that should also be
found elsewhere. A similar finding is reported by Ingold’s (2014)
study on regional Swiss flood prevention and land use policies:
state-level actors played a crucial role in connecting the local and
the national level during the top-down implementation of
regional projects.
Actors occupying both positions
There are two actors in the urban and three in the rural regions
who occupy positions that enable them to adopt periphery
connector as well as central coordinator positions. In the rural
region, one of them is the state-level utilities agency (AIB). This
agency is situated in the periphery of the network, but has ties to
many core actors and to other important peripheral actors, such
as the FOEN or the state-level fishery association. Beyond this,
it exclusively collaborates with two regional engineering and
consulting firms.  
In the urban region, a look at the only local-level actor occupying
both a central coordinator as well as periphery connector position
further illustrates both concepts. The actor is a municipal local
water technician working for a larger municipality. Taking a closer
look at the position and activities of this actor shows that this
technician is the only actor who collaborates regularly with the
local university in the region because of a project mapping
groundwater streams. This exemplifies an important aspect of its
periphery connector position, that is, to bring external knowledge
into the governance network. The water technician also has an
above-average amount of connections to other municipalities and
geographically adjacent local actors. In the context of this specific
case, the large amount of connections can be explained by the
hydrologically important position of the technician’s municipality
within the region. The municipal territory entails the most
important regional groundwater recharge area as well as the site
of an accidental fire in a chemical storage facility leading to a
significant chemical spill in 1986 that is still being monitored.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated periphery connectors and
central coordinators as two specific bridging actor positions that
connect actors in governance settings with a high potential for
fragmentation. Studying decentralized regional water supply
governance structures in Switzerland with high potential for
fragmentation, we have shown an effective formal way of
operationalizing both positions, based on betweenness centrality
computed on ego networks, and a simple node deletion procedure.
Further, we have demonstrated that both bridging positions are
more likely to be occupied by some actors than others in three
important ways.  
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First, when it comes to overcoming fragmentation, higher level
actors provide crucial access to heterogeneity. Higher level actors
were more likely to be periphery connectors in our cases,
connecting organizations not involved in the day-to-day
operations of water supply management to a regional governance
network. These actors can provide potential inputs for pluralistic
thinking and innovation. Second, governmental actors are more
likely than others to be central coordinators. This is in line with
previous research on governance and policy networks that has
argued that governmental actors remain “special” in these
networks (Calanni et al. 2014, Fischer 2017), even taking into
account a proposed shift from governance to governance (Rhodes
1996) with a more limited role for governmental actors.
Governmental actors are able to draw upon sources of power that
are inaccessible to other actors, which influences collaborative
processes and should therefore be taken in account in their
analysis (Brisbois and de Loë 2016). Third, actors are most likely
to provide central coordination if  they are located at the
subnational, state level. We argued that this is due to the mixture
of specific oversight functions (for governmental actors) and the
combination of local level involvement and a broader perspective
that accrues at the state level. Thus, even in contexts where the
institutional setting provides barriers for hierarchical
coordination, overcoming fragmentation through collaboration
remains a task that is mediated by state-level actors.  
The aim of our analysis was to show that in a given natural
resource governance setting, it pays to look beyond the
institutional arrangement to the existing setting of collaboration
among actors. Institutional and policy change might be one
means to overcome fragmentation, but it could sometimes be
more effective to tweak an existing setting by encouraging the
activities of, and facilitate interactions between certain individual
actors (Borg et al. 2015). In this context, we have also identified
governmental and higher level actors as promising candidates for
such a task.  
Our analysis has important limitations that should be addressed
in future research. First, our results proved reasonably robust
across three cases that differ along a continuum from urban to
rural regions. Still, as we observe a degree of variation between
regions, this points to the value of analyzing further contextual
conditions. Among further conditions that might influence the
capacity and willingness of actors to occupy different network
positions could be the level of conflict (Weible et al. 2010) or the
institutional specificities in the respective project set-up, such as
comparing top-down versus bottom-up approaches (Ingold
2014). Furthermore, our research design held the substantive
sector (water supply), and state-level as well as national-level
institutional factors constant. The specific setting of Switzerland
as a country with well-functioning institutions, professional
government agencies, and a high level of trust in public agencies
needs to be acknowledged (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, Sciarini et
al. 2015). This setting makes it very likely that governmental actors
are highly active in governance networks because of legal
requirements and their specific capabilities and the results
pertaining to the role of governmental actors may thus not
transfer readily to settings with weak institutions. However, even
in settings with weak institutions, higher level actors could have
access to a broader and more heterogeneous actor set than local
level stakeholders.  
Second, there is a notion of causality inherent to all of our
hypotheses that sees actors as individual agents making an
informed, purposeful decision to assume a position associated
with a certain role based on their varying goals or incentives. This
methodologically individualistic logic could however also be
reversed, as an actor might not make a purposeful decision to
become a coordinator or periphery connector or even perceive
itself  as one, but could simply end up in a given network position
based on the accumulated decisions by other actors that lead it
to end up there without making any strategic choice. In reality, a
combination of both of these forces, individual decision making
and structural opportunity structures, are probably at play. Future
analyses should aim at disentangling the direction of causality
inherent to all our hypotheses to explore further how a given
network structure originates between individual-level agency and
structural, contextual factors.  
Third, our justification for researching actor roles that help to
overcome fragmentation rests on the assumption that overcoming
fragmentation contributes to outcomes, notably effective
governance through improved coordination and access to new
knowledge. This provides the underlying, normative justification
for research on the topic. However, we did not directly study
outcomes in our research and are thus unable to further scrutinize
this assumption. Specifying the causal pathways through which
different actors contribute to specific governance outcomes thus
remains a crucial field for future research.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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Figure A1.1: Sensitivity analyses for number of central coordinators depending on variation in cut-off values 
(standard deviations above mean ego betweenness score) for rural, peri-urban, and urban region
Model 1
Edges −3.25∗
[−4.55; −2.57]
Geometrically weighted (α = 0.5) edgewise shared partners 1.60∗
[1.34; 2.27]
Geometrically weighted (α = 1.2) degree −6.87∗
[−7.85; −5.80]
Geometrically weighted (α = 0.1) dyad-wise shared partners −0.10∗
[−0.10; −0.09]
isolates −27.42∗
[−31.52; −28.42]
State level activity 0.38∗
[0.10; 0.61]
Regional level activity 0.40∗
[0.23; 0.48]
Local level activity 0.00
[−0.10; 0.09]
Level homophily 0.04
[−0.02; 0.19]
∗ 0 outside the confidence interval
Table A1.1: Coefficients of pooled exponential random graph model used to generate baseline distributions in 
permuta-tional analysis. Confidence intervals in square brackets
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